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Abstract
The Onion Routing (TOR) project is a network of virtual tunnels that facilitates secure, private
communicationsontheinternet.Arecentarticlepublishedin“TheRegistry”claimsthatTORbundle
browser usage has increased in recent years; statistics show that in January 2012, there were
approximately 950,000 users globally and now in August 2013 that figure is estimated to have
reached1,200,000users.ThereportalsoillustratesthatTheUnitedstatesofAmericaandtheUnited
Kingdom are major contributors towards the massive increase in TOR usage. Similarly, other
countrieslikeIndiaandBrazilhaveincreasedusageto32,000and85,000respectively.Thisresearch
paper will be an introduction and identifies the need for research in this area, and provides a
literature review on existing research. The objective of this paper is to discuss the existing
methodologies for analysing forensic artefacts from RAM from the use of the TOR browser bundle
and to propose a synthesized forensic analysis framework that can be used for analysing TOR
artefacts.
Keywords
Darknet,TOR,TAILS,Cybercrime
INTRODUCTION
Cyberwarzone reports claim that darknet contains index of more than 70,000 websites hosted
illegally which are not visible to normal internet user. Some of the anonymous browsers are TOR
bundlebrowser,Relakks,WasteAgain,andfreenetthatcanbeusedforestablishingconnectionto
darknet.Asinstallationandusageoftheanonymousbrowsersisverysimpleanduserfriendly,there
isaamountofusersaccessingdarknetsforunethicalorillegalactivities(Fachkhaetal.,2012).
Oneofthemainreasonsforthisspikeisbecausetheyprovidefreedomofspeechtotheusersand
alsoencryptsthetraffic,thushidingtheidentityoftheuserstosomeextent.Atthesametime,this
has become a great benefit for cybercriminals and unethical users for accessing all the available
illegalservicesorhostedhiddenlinks.Therefore thiseasyaccess todarknet hashikedcrimerates
involving illegal activities such as online drug dealing, child pornography, hidden wiki hosting
devices,crimeasaservice(Sharwood,2013).
AccordingtothearticlebyCyberwarzone,reportsclaimthatdarknetcontainsnearly600TBofdata
and 500 times larger than normal internet visibility(CWZ, 2013). As the majority of the content
availableareillegalonlinestores,assassins,drugdealers,stolengoodssale,andmediumforterrorist
communications;thismakesdarknetcontentmoredangeroustosurf.
Inthiscurrentscenario,whenauserusesTORbundlebrowserforaccessingillegalinformation,the
lackof monitoring control makes it difficult to forensically detect and identify the traffic. The
significanceofthestudyisrequiredtodevelopaforensicsoundmethodologytodetectTORbundle
browserusagefrommemorydumpofthewindowsmachine.Thisenablesanalysisandrecoveryof
the artefacts using TOR bundle browser for organization or even jurisdiction purpose (Murdoch &
Danezis, 2005). However, recent arrest of The Silk Road founder has given additional hope of
identifyingtheusersaccessingdarknetforillegalpurposes.
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Many authors have perused studies and research on darknet and different ways for establishing
connection through many anonymous browsers. This includes detection of TOR traffic on network
infrastructure, detecting TOR traffic on a windows operating system, and general memory dump
analysis.Buttherewerenoproperresearchbeingaimedtocovermemorydumpforensicspecifically
foranalysingartefactsofTORbundlebrowserusage.Thus,thereisahugegapinthisareawithout
beingexplored–andthisresearchwillfocustoaddressthisgapandaimstoproposeamethodology
whichsynthesizesmemorydumpforensicanalysisanddetectionofTORbundlebrowserartefacts.

TORBUNDLEBROWSER–THEWORKING
TORusesamethodologycalledonionroutingconsistingofTORrelays,volunteersTORservers,exit
nodes. When a user installs the TOR bundle browser and runs it; it automatically establishes
connectionandisreadyfortheuser.Figure1,illustratestheTORbundlebrowserconsistingofthree
components for sending encrypted traffic, namely an entry node, a middleman, and an exit node.
Whenauserinitiatesaconnectionitfirstreachestheentrynodeandisthensentthroughmultiple
middleman nodes which volunteers to this traffic and goes to the exist node and then to the
destinationserver.TORusespublickeyforencryptingthetransmittingmessagesformultiplelayers
until the exit nodes. However, the traffic from the exit node to the destination server is
unencrypted(Biryukov,Pustogarov,&Weinmann,2013).


Figure1:TORbundleBrowserWorking

On analysing the TOR bundle browser operation and workings, it is evident that when a user
establishes TCP connection it highly impossible to detect the traffic since it has multilayer of
encryption. Hence,detectingtheTORtraffichasalwaysbeenextremelyimportantfrom asecurity
perspectiveandforensicrecoveryperspectiveaswell.

Published research available on TOR bundle browser memory dump forensic analysis is currently
verylimited.Existingresearchisavailablefor:

x Generalmemorydumpforensicanalysisandrecovery.
x MonitoringordetectionofTORbrowserinanetwork.

There is a huge gap in this area – and this research aims to address this gap using the proposed
forensicprocess.
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EXISTINGDETECTIONMETHODSAVAILABLE
ArtefactsfromOperatingSystem
InreferencetotheresearchpaperbyRunaA.Sandvik(2013),theauthorhasillustratedtheforensic
analysis and documented traceable evidence that TOR bundle browser can leave in a windows
machine. The author has also analysed and recorded the directory path of TOR bundle browser
artefacts acquired from windows OS. From the research paper, the path or directories with TOR
artefactsidentifiedwerethefollowing:

x PrefetchfolderC:\Windows\Prefetch\.
x Thumbnailcachememory
x WindowsPagingFile
x WindowsRegistry{Sandvik,2013#49}.

A similar analysis was performed by Andrew Case on “DeAnonymizing Live CDs through Physical
Memory Analysis”,where the author has discussed different forensic techniques for recovery of
using The Amnesic Incognito Live System (TAILS)(Case, n.d.). The TAILS is a LIVE operating system
(Linux)bootablefromDVDoranyportabledevice.Allinternetconnectionisestablishedandtrafficis
forcedtopassthroughTORnetwork.Inthispaper,theauthorhascoveredsmallsectionsoninitial
memorydumpanalysisforforensicallyretrievingartefacts.TheauthorillustratesthatPythonscripts
canbeusedtoanalysespecificTORdatastructureswhereinformationregardingtheartefactsare
stored. However, the author hasn’t proved the script’s practical workability for artefacts recovery
{Case, n.d. #50}(Dodge, Mullins, Peterson, & Okolica, 2010)(Sutherland, Evans, Tryfonas, & Blyth,
2008).

ArtefactsfromNetworkTraffic
As the TOR bundle browser encrypts all possible traffic sent through TOR entry node, middleman,
andexitnodesbyaddinghighlevelmultilayerencryptioneachtimeitpassesthroughamiddleman
node.DetectingtheTORtrafficandanykindofproxyusageishighlyessentialonnetworkforensic
perspective.(Fachkhaetal.,2012)(Berthier&Cukier,2008).

AuthorJohnBrozycki,intheresearchpaper“DetectingandPreventingAnonymousProxyusage”has
penned down the techniques that could be used for detecting any anonymous proxies by using
SNORTrules.Forthispurpose,theauthorusedVidaliapackage–aTORpackageforestablishingTOR
connections.TheauthorclaimsthatusingthebelowSNORTruleasgiveninfigure2,candetectTOR
bundlebrowsertraffic{Brozycki,2008#36}(Mizoguchi,Fukushima,Kasahara,Hori,&Sakurai,2010).




Figure2:SNORTruledevelopedbyJohnBrozycki


AsimilarmethodwasalsosupportedbyDavid’sSNORTrule(figure3),founderofSeclitsblog.The
authorstatedthatitcouldalsodetecttheTORbrowserusage.However,therewerenotanyproven
resultsdocumentedinthepaper.




Figure3:SNORTruledevelopedbyDavid

{Brozycki,2008#36}
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Furthermore,Sambuddhoetal(SambuddhoChakravarty)hasperformedresearchondetectingTOR
traffic using Decoys. For this research, the author used decoy traffic (bait) for detecting the proxy
connectionsincludingTORbundlebrowsertraffic.Inthispaper,theauthorshavecreatedmanybait
servers and made the servers available in the TOR network. This implementation has been
performed by using IMAP and SMTP servers and entice credentials have been created so that
cybercriminalscanbeattractedtoaccesstheirservicesintheirhostedservers.Figure4,illustrates
the“Rogueexitnode”whichactsasabaitforTORusers,allthetrafficpassingthroughrogueexit
node is recorded. This setup was kept online or active for duration of ten months and different
activitiestryingtocompromisetheserversusingHTTPsessionhijackingattacksweremonitoredand
recorded.


Figure4:Decoytrafficfordetectingtheproxyconnections(SambuddhoChakravarty,2011)


The author states that this research paper will be beneficial to identify and analyse the behaviour
andstatisticofactivitiesontherogueexitnode.Asstatedearlier,thetrafficfromandtoexitnodes
aretheonlyunencryptedtrafficbytheTORnetwork.However,whenpassingthroughtherogueexit
node; this setup can collect statistics and particulars of the hosts connecting through that
compromisedexitnodeanditcannottraceothermiddlemannodes(previoushops)involvedinthe
TORnetworkrouting.ThismethodrevealstheIPaddressofthehostsenteringtheexitnodebutnot
the actual IP address of the machine or even any of the middleman nodes involved in the TOR
network(Xuefeng,Yong,&XiaMu,2008).

Maliciousbrowserplugins
In August 2013, it was confirmed that attackers had exploited the vulnerability in TOR bundle
browser Firefox plugin which can disclose the source IP address of the TOR users. This malicious
codewasinjectedfromadarknethostcalled“FreedomHosting”,theuserswhovisitedthishidden
service website were compromised as it exploits the memorymanagement vulnerability in Firefox
browser(Goodin,2013).ThismaliciousJavaScriptwouldmakeFirefoxsendauniqueidentifiertoa
public server by which the source IP address can be traced back. I addition to this, a reverse
engineering security specialist claimed that this malicious code reveals some of the IP address in
Reston,Virgina(POULSEN,2013).

However, if the TOR user does not visit that compromised hosted website then, the chance of
FirefoxpluginbeingexploitediscomparativelylowtodetecttheTORartefacts.Ontheotherhand,
there is high possibility of retrieving significant forensic evidence of TOR bundle browser artefacts
fromawindowsmachineusingthe“MemoryDump”.Thenextsectionwillaimntoprovideliterature
reviewonmemorydumpforensicanalysis(Brozycki,2008).
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MEMORYDUMPANALYSIS
Whymemorydumpanalysis
Memory dump analysis has always been a critical and interesting area for forensic investigations.
The information stored in the memory of the computer has significant importance. For example,
whenacybercriminalusesbootableLIVECDorUSBsuchasTAILSwithawindowsorLinuxoperating
system,thennosignificantinformationisstoredinthephysicalhostcomputer.Thisisbecausethe
machinebootsfromtheCDorportableUSBwithselfcontainedharddriveandevenifthephysical
computeriscapturedandforensicallyanalysednotmuchevidencecanberetrieved.

Consider,asuspectusesTAILSforconnectingtosomeillegaldarknetwebsite.Inthisscenario,allthe
internetconnectionsestablishedfromthatmachineareforcedtogothroughtheTORnetworkwith
multilevelencryptionandthustheidentityoftheuserishiddentosomeextent–leavingbehindno
potential evidence. Thus, retrieving the memory dump from the suspect machine and analysing it
forensicallycouldprovidemoreforensicevidenceofTORbundlebrowserusage(Aljaedi,Lindskog,
Zavarsky,Ruhl,&Almari,2011).

Whatinformationarestoredinmemorydump?
Theglimpseoftheinformationstoredinthememorydumparegivenbelow:

x Allthedetailsabouttheimageincludingdate,time,andCPUusagearerecorded.
x Processes,processID–allrunningprocessintheoperatingsystem.
x Network connections – what network connections were available at the time of memory
dumpcaptured.
x DLLs,memorymaps,objects,encryptionkeys.
x Programs,hiddenprograms,rootkits,promiscuouscodes.
x Registryinformationoftheoperatingsystem.
x APIfunctions,systemcalltables.
x Graphiccontents.

As the memory dump contains significant information, analysing it forensically will help to detect,
recoverandanalyseartefactsofTORbundlebrowserusage.

TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES AVAILABLE FOR RETRIEVING DIFFERENT TYPE OF EVIDENCE FROM
MEMORYDUMP
Extractionofgraphiccontent
InreferencetotheresearchpaperbyStephanetal(2011),theauthorsillustratedtheprocess(figure
5) for extracting the graphic content information from the memory dump of windows based
machine(Kiltz,Hoppe,&Dittmann,2009).Inaddition,theauthorsalsodevelopedaforensicmodel
(figure 6) used for this research. The extraction process (figure 5) used by Stephan et al (2011)
involves strategic preparation, operational preparation, data gathering, data investigation, data
analysis,andfinaldocumentationwithevidencepresentation.

Strategic
Preparation

Operational
Preparation

DataGathering

Data
Investigation

DataAnalysis

Documentation


Figure5:ExtractionProcessofgraphiccontentfrommemorydump
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Figure6:Stephanetal(2011)proposedForensicmodel


Figure 6, illustrates the proposed forensic model with different data type for extracting graphic
content. According to the author, forensically relevant data types are hardware data, raw data,
detailsaboutdata,configurationdata,communicationprotocoldata,processdata,sessiondata,and
userdata.Inaddition,theothertoolsusedtoretrievethegraphiccontentfromthememorydump
wereIrfanViewandvolatilityframework(Kiltzetal.,2009)(McRee).

Volatilitymemoryanalysis
Inlinewiththisanalysis,thevolatilitystoragemediumplaysavitalpartinthissection.Thisisalso
termed as temporary memory in some area of research which stores information about running
process, process ID, DLLs information and other forensic evidences. According to the paper
“TechniquesandToolsforRecoveringandAnalysingDatafromVolatileMemory”(Amari)published
bySANSInstitutetheauthorclaimspossiblewaystoacquirethememoryaslistedbelow:

Hardwarebasedacquisition:
This process requires the computer to be suspended and DMA (direct memory access) is used to
obtainthecopyofthememorydump.

Softwarebasedacquisition:
Thismethodiseasierandmoreuserfriendlyforacquiringthevolatilememoryusingsoftwaresuch
asmemorydumpordd.Thistechniqueiswidelyusedintheforensicanalysisarea.Inaddition,the
authorhasexplainedhowthevolatilememoryworksinwindowsandLinuxoperatingsystems.He
claimsthatthememorymapfilescanberecoveredbyviewingtherootoftheVADtreewhichstores
specificinformationabouttheprocesses,events,applicationerrors,logs.Theothersignificantarea
in windows based system for memory analysis is “control area” which could help in retrieving the
informationregardingthefilenamesanddatastored.Similarly,inLinuxsystemthedatastructureis
termedasinode.Furthermore,thepaperalsodocumentstheavailablememoryforensictoolsthat
canbeusedforvolatilitymemoryanalysis.(Amari)(Mrdovic,Huseinovic,&Zajko,2009)
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A similar memory dump analysis using volatility framework was performed by Chad Tilbury and
cheatsheetwasdevelopednamed“MemoryForensicsCheatsheetv1.1”.Inthispaper,theauthor
documented the different commands that can be used to trace different types of artefacts using
volatilityframeworkasshownintable1(Tilbury,n.d.)
VolatilityFrameworkonmemorydumpanalysis
RegistryAnalysisArtefacts

RootkitArtefacts

NetworkArtefacts

RogueProcessArtefacts

PromiscuousModeArtefacts
PromiscuousProcessandDrivers

Hivelist #vol.pyhivelist
Hivedump#vol.pyhivedump–o0xe1a14b60
Printkey#vol.pyprintkey–K
Userassist#vol.pyuserassist
Hashdump#vol.pyhashdump–y0x8781c008–s0x87f6b9c8
Psxview #vol.pypsxview
Driverscan#vol.pydriverscan
Apihooks#vol.pyapihooks
Ssdt#vol.pyssdt|egrep–v
Driverirp#vol.pydriverirp–rtcpip
Idt#vol.pyidt
Connections #vol.pyconnections
Connscan#vol.pyconnscan
Sockets#vol.pysockets
Sockscan#vol.pysockscan
Netscan#vol.pynetscan
Pslist  #vol.pypslist
Psscan#vol.pypsscan
Pstree#vol.pypstree
Malfind #vol.pymalfinddumpdir./output_dir
Ldrmodules#vol.pyldrmodules–p868v
Dlldump #vol.pydlldumpdumpdir./output–rmetsrv
Moddump#vol.pymoddumpdumpdir./output–rgaopdx
Procmemdump#vol.pyprocmemdumpdumpdir./out–p868
Memdump#vol.pymemdump–dumpdir./output–p868

Table1:MemoryForensicsCheatsheetv1.1byChadTilbury

RecoveringWindowsregistryinformationfrommemorydump
Windows registry is significant area for recovering and analysing potential evidence about each
event on a windows machine. Shuhui Zhang et al (2011) have proposed a method for recovering
windowsregistryinformationfromthememorydump.Figure7istheproposedflowchartbyShuhui
Zhangetal(2011)forextractingtheHIVEfilesfromthememorydump.SincetheHivefilescontain
all the necessary information including metadata, handles, objects, keys, data structures and file
mapswhicharepotentiallysignificantforforensicmemoryanalysis.

77




Figure7:ProposedMethodologyforrecoveringWindowsRegistryArtefacts
(Shuhui,Lianhai,&Lei,2011)
AsimilarpaperwaswrittenbyFarmeretal(n.d.)onforensicanalysisofwindowsregistry.However,
inthisresearchpaper,theauthorshaveillustratedforensicanalysisbydirectlyviewingthewindows
registryandnotanalysingfromthememorydump.Theauthorhaveanalysedanddocumentedthe
possibleevidencesthatcouldberecoveredfromwindowsregistrysuchas:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

RegistryHiveLocations
MRULists(MostRecentlyUsedList)
WirelessNetworksdetails
Networkdetails
LANcomputerconnectedthroughthemachine
Portabledevicesconnected
ArtefactsofIE
Windowspasswords
IMchatdetails
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LiteratureReviewMatrix


MemoryDumpAnalysis

TORBrowserDetection

Windows|WindowsRegistryOSAnalysis


Volatile Memory Data Analysis | Volatility
Framework







NetworkDetectionAnalysis




OtherOperatingsystemforensicanalysis




Table2:LiteratureReviewMatrix



Researchareacovered|

Researchareawithscopeoryettoexplore!

Table 2 shows summarization of the literature review on techniques available for retrieving TOR
bundle browser artefacts. It is evident that many researchers have explored the techniques for
recoveringevidenceofTORtrafficonnetworksandbysettingupbaitexitnode(rogueexitnode).
Similarly,researcheshavecarriedonretrievingtheartefactsofTORusagefromWindowsandLinux
operating systems. However, no research materials were found on recovering and analysing
artefactsofTORbundlebrowserfromthememorydumpofawindowsmachine.Tomoveforward
withthisproject,thislackofcoverage,orgapwillbeaddressedandamethodologywillbeproposed
toanalysetheTORbundlebrowserartefactsfromthememorydumpofawindowsmachine.

79



Setup
Windows

Setup
Windows

InitialStage

SendEncrypted
P2P messages

InstallTOR
Bundle Browser

SetupPhase

Capturethe
memory dump

CapturingEvidence

WindowsGraphic
content recovery

Window’s
Registry TOR

Windowspath
details
Analysingusing
Mandiant
Memoryze
WindowsRegistry
Recovery

RegistryHIVES

Evidence
Presentation

Analysingusing
Volatility

Analysis

Figure8:MemoryDumpAnalysisforArtefactsofusingTORBundleBrowser
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THEORITICALFRAMEWORK
Figure8illustratesthetheoreticalframeworkofhowtheresearch/experimentwillbeperformedtoanalysethememorydumptorecovertheartefactsof
TORbundlebrowserusage.Inaddition,themainagendaistogenerateasynthesismethodologybycombiningTORbundlebrowserdetectionandmemory
dumpanalysis.




1. InitialPhase
 Twowindowsvirtualmachineswillbeconfigured.
2. SetupPhase
 The PC will be installed with latest version of TOR bundle browser for this project.
Communications will be established via TOR network to the two machines and illegal hidden
serviceswillnotbeexamined.Forthisreason,boththeendpointsaresetupbytheauthorand
onlytheTORnetworkisbeingusedtoroutetraffic.
3. CapturingEvidence
 Aftersuccessfullysendingencryptedmessagesfromendpointtoother,eachofthePC’smemory
will be captured and memory dump will be created using software “Dumpit” in a forensically
soundmanner.Thecreatedmemorydumpwillbehashedtomaintainingintegrityandcopieswill
bemadebeforeperformingtheanalysisusingforensictools.
4. Analysis
 Analysis and examination will be performed using memory dump forensic tools such as the
volatility framework and Mandiant Memoryze analyser for analysing TOR bundle browser
artefacts.Inaddition,asstatedbyStephanetal(2011)thewindowsgraphiccontentevidencein
reference to TOR trafficwillbeanalysed.Furthermore,ShuhuiZhang etal(2011) methodology
forrecoveringthewindowsregistryinformationfromthememorydumpwillbeperformedand
logeventrunningsheetasgivenintable3willbemaintainedcapturingalltheevents.
Table3:SampleLogEventRunningSheet

Date


Time Comments



ActionTakenBy


Investigator1


5. EvidencePresentation
ThissectionwillaintoprovidetheartefactsandevidencefromregistryHIVES,windowsdirectory,
andwindowsregistrydetails.Theevidenceandartefactsthatwereidentifiedandrecoveredfrom
thepreviousanalysisstepwillbepresentedinforensicreportmanner.Alltherecoveredevidence
willbehashedandlogofeventswillshowtheanalysisflowfollowedbytheauthor.Finally,the
evidencerecoveredfromvolatilityframeworkandMandiantMemoryzewillbedocumented(refer
table4).

Table4:SampleEvidencePresentationsheet

Date 
PathFound
HashValue
EvidenceFile



Time 

Filename


MD5 




SHA1 
EvidenceComments

Investigator
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ResearchFramework


Figure10:ProposedResearchEnvironmentforthisProject


Figure 10 illustrates the proposed research environment setup for perusing this project. In this
scenario, two end points are be arranged by the author, one of the end points is a machine with
windows operating system and the second end point will be a windows web server. Both the
windows machines will be installed with TOR bundle browser with appropriate plugins. Once the
setupiscompleted,thewindowsmachinewillaccessfilesorcommunicatewiththewebserverand
routeonlyTORtraffic.Asdepictedintheabovefigure10,thecommunicationbetweenthewindows
machine and web server is carried by volunteered TOR nodes in the TOR network. These are the
machine all over the world with TOR bundle browser installed. After accessing the files using TOR
network,thememorydumpofthewindowsmachinewillbecapturedinforensicallysoundmanner
using “dumpit” software. Finally, the memory dump will be analysed and artefacts of TOR bundle
browser and any other suspicious proxy traffic will be recorded and presented in the evidence
presentationsection.

LIMITATIONS
AcurrentlimitationinTORbundlebrowserdetectionresearchisthatthereaislackofestablished
researchdrivenmethodsavailableforretrievingandrecoveringTORartefactsfrommemorydump.
This area is so new, that there is no material or and have been no experiments conducted by
industryandresearchersonanalysingandretrievingartefactsevidencefrommemorydumpofTOR
browserusage.Achallengeforthisresearchistoaddressthislimitationasthisresearchwillbefirst
ofitskind,andtoestablishmethodologiesfortestingandresearch.
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FUTUREWORK
Due to the limitations and time constraints the proposed methodology hasn’t been implemented
andtested.Asafuturework,theproposedmethodologywillbetestedasillustratedintheforensic
processandevidencewillbepresentedinthenextpaperasaprototypemodel.

CONCLUSION
Thismainobjectiveofthispaperwastopresenttheneedofresearchinmemorydumpanalysison
detectingTORbundlebrowser.ThiswouldbefirststeptodetecttheusageofTORfromthephysical
machine.Oncetheproposedsynthesismethodologyisdevelopedandtested;thiscanalsobeused
byorganisationsformonitoring,analysingorprovidingevidenceforusingTORbundlebrowser.This
areaneedsmoreattentionandmoreresearchwillbeperformedoncethismethodologyhasbeen
developed.
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